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Incident Investigations, Reports and Data

The Port of London's Authority's Marine Management Team (MMM) regularly reviews the Safety Management System's (SMS) performance against our three yearly Marine Safety Plan.

Below are the latest Quarterly and Annual SMS Reports which contain these SMS reviews as well as Incident Statistics.

SMS Reports

Six Monthly Report

Jan - Jun 2019

Jan- Jun 2020

Jan - Jun 2021

Jan - Jun 2022

Annual Reports





For any questions regarding the above reports please contact the Marine Compliance Team at [email protected]

To make any comments or if you have any queries in relation to the PLA's compliance with the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) please contact our Designated Person:

 [email protected]  - 023 8071 1892 or 023 8071 1889

Designated Person (PMSC) 'Port of London Authority'


Quayside Suite | Medina Chambers | Town Quay | Southampton | SO14 2AQ

Web: www.abpmer.co.uk | www.portriskmanagement.com


Summary of Navigational Incidents in the Port of London


An Integral part of the Port's marine Safety Management System involves the investigation of all navigational incidents that are reported to the Harbour Master. Following an initial assessment, all Navigational Incidents (those affecting or having the potential to impact upon navigational safety) are investigated further, from both a regulatory and safety perspective. Details of the incident, the investigation and outcomes are recorded in an incident database.

Serious Incidents which have been investigated by the Harbour Master are summarised below:

Date Incident Description Actions
29/03/2021 On the 29th March 2021 A container vessel was approaching the berth ready to commence a swing, preparing to berth port side to alongside the terminal when the vessel continued on a south west trajectory and went aground on the opposing side of the channel. The vessel was able to re-float back into the navigational channel with the assistance of tugs and berth safely. No damage, pollution or injuries were caused.

Contributing factors

There are a number of factors which contributed towards the incident. In summary these were determined to include:

  • The lack of a passage plan;
  • Vessels speed which caused distraction to the Pilot;
  • Lack of monitoring vessels position;
  • Inappropriate use of vessel engines, rudder and positioning of tugs;
  • Lack of corrective measures when the swing did not go to plan;
  • Bridge team management was not effective.

All these factors contributed to the vessel coming to ground on the south side of the navigational channel, when there were no other mechanical or environmental reasons to affect the vessel. 

Recommendations on the PLA

Pilot to undertake time in simulator followed by a practical trip with similar vessel characteristics with a senior pilot to enhance learning experience. Pilotage Manager to reissue updated version of OPL/2008/06 and re-word and reissue Operational letter OPL/2008/06 making clear the passage plan process during COVID restrictions.

Harbour Masters to Review best practice and processes for swinging large vessels and are recommended to commence periodical audits of pilot passage plans of all classes to determine if fit for purpose. They are also recommended to develop procedures to include initial actions post serious incident. A copy of the investigation report should be circulated to all Pilots.

Recommendations for tug operator

Superintendent to ensure good positive communication is established & maintained between the Tug Master and Pilot to include confirmation of the securing positions & at all times during towage operations.

Actions taken by the VESSEL

Onboard training to be conducted by Master for all bridge team members including lookout/helmsman.

Training on “Roles/Responsibility of Bridge Team During Pilotage & Master/Pilot Relationship” to be conducted for all deck officers including Master.

DPA to Re-iterate to fleet vessels the need to conduct detailed Master/Pilot Information Exchanges.

DPA to share Incident report with entire fleet vessels for the lessons learnt.

07/07/2019 Vessel made contact with number 2 arch of Westminster Bridge, and was subsequently stuck under the bridge.

Vessel Operator to issue an Operations Memorandum to all crew members as a reminder of all engineering checks which are required, in addition to further educational discussions with the Master.

17/06/2019 Crew member injured arm whilst letting go aft spring during letting go operation. Paramedics attended and casualty (Ch. Mate) taken to hospital.

Note placed in POLARIS asking for the Harbour Master to be informed prior to the next call of the vessel following which the harbour service launch will visit the vessel and inspect it's mooring lines and give educational advice regarding the use of the ship's mooring lines as tow lines.

MAIB have been informed and followed up themselves receiving no further information to that provided by the PLA.

06/06/2019 Fatal man overboard from a recreational angling boat.

Assistant Harbour Master (Recreational) provided radar recordings and a statement to Kent Police to assist their investigation and report to the Coroner.

PLA to await the findings of the Coroner's Inquest and review to determine any appropriate actions.

04/05/2019 On the 4th May 2019 a Pilot tripped on the bridge of a vessel injuring arm resulting in Lost Time Accident.

PLA are to:

Remind ALL Pilots of the importance to report incidents in a timely manner.


Circulate report to all pilots.


Remind Masters for the need for a Good Bridge familiarisation briefing when an new or unfamiliar Pilot is on the Bridge.


Review the highlighting of the raised platform to make more visible. 

22/04/2019 Man overboard in an annual canoe race, resulting in a fatality.

The report recommends that the event organisers conduct a full review of the event risk assessment. This risk assessment is to identify all navigational hazards on the tidal Thames. All hazards are to be assessed and the appropriate level of mitigation is to be put in place before the next event. Further, a comprehensive communications plan to be submitted.

The Harbour Master's Department has taken action with the support of British Canoeing. A Safety Alert was published describing that serious incidents which have occurred in 2019 on the Thames Tideway resulting in paddlers being swept under industrial works barges on the Tideway.

The lessons regarding communications, risk assessment and fatigue are to be shared for all future events as appropriate.


A Passenger rib with 8 passengers on board was navigating out bound on a charter to North Greenwich Pier.  The Rib was navigating at speed and passed inside the Upper Outer Wing Buoy at which point the Master reduced speed to 26 knots before making contact with the Lower Outer Wing Buoy.  The rib was launched into the air and on landing a number of passenger were knocked out of their seats, but remained on the vessel.  The Master and Deckhand both made contact with the console screen causing facial injuries.

The incident was investigated by the MAIB and MCA Enforcement.  The cause of the incident was a failure to maintain a proper lookout, but further issues were identified with the company’s SMS and Passage Planning.

The company are to:

1. Revise training including competencies required to keep an effective look out through the Type Rating for the Master and crew

2. Navigational Risk Assessment, SMS and Passage Plan to be updated to address high risk areas and identify hazards to navigation.

3. Review and update safety management system using the principles described in chapter 18 of the HSC Code, and relevant sections of the ISM code as detailed in the Technical Requirements for the issue of a CoC and submit to PLA for approval.

4. Review functions of the DPA and passenger counting and where that information is held to ensure compliance with the principles described in Chapter 18 of the High Speed Craft Code

Port of London Authority is recommended to:

1. Undertake a review of the PLA Navigational Risk Assessment for High Speed RIB operations in central London

2. Undertake a review of the Certificate of Compliance Technical requirements

3. Should the company meet the requirements for re- issue of a Certificate of Compliance, undertake a ‘For Cause' audit three months after the Certificate of Compliance is reinstated to ensure SMS has been fully applied to the operation.

The incident is also being investigated by the MAIB.

Enforcement Action:        

MCA Enforcement leading on a prosecution under the Merchant Shipping Act.

14/12/2018 A Class V Passenger Vessel was inward bound with 5 PoB, crew only, having disembarked passengers at Greenwich Pier. On passing the Marine Police Pier, the Class V Passenger Vessel made a large alteration of course to starboard and made bow first contact with the Marine Police Engineers Pier at a speed of 7.7 knots. Approximately 50 seconds later the Class V Passenger Vessel backed away from the Marine Police Engineers Pier and made contact with a Marine Police vessel, moored on the outside face of the Marine Police Pier. The Master of the Class V Passenger Vessel was breathalysed, the result was negative. There were no injuries as a result of the contact. Fatigue was the primary cause of this incident.

Harbour Master has advised the company to check hours worked for causal labour to ensure adequate rest time and compliance with MSN 1876. The company has implemented a procedure.

MCA have placed a requirement on the Class V Passenger Vessel to have a dedicated lookout in the wheel house at all times, this has been introduced with immediate effect.

Harbour Master has advised the company to install CCTV on their vessels. The company have advised they are investigating.

Harbour Master has advised London River Services (LRS) of the investigation and to request further consideration is given to making CCTV a requirement to use LRS owned piers.

MCA Enforcement are leading on the prosecution of the Master. The Master has had the Boat Masters License suspended on medical grounds.


A bitumen tanker ran aground on the south side of the channel whilst swinging off the berth having departed a Jetty. The pilot reported that the vessel did not turn as expected.

Contributing Factors

1. Pilot’s lack of situational awareness

2. Insufficient information passed to the Master regarding the intended manoeuvre, tidal conditions expected and assessment on whether tugs were required, prior to departure.

3. During the pilot master exchange the Master did not highlight to the pilot that there was no electronic charts available on the bridge wing and there was no agreement on how the positioning would be jointly monitored.

4. Combination of large trim and high ahead speed resulted in the vessel not turning tightly enough. In this instance the rate of turn did not increase sufficiently and instead the additional headway increased the turning circle, resulting in the vessel grounding outside the navigational channel.

Other Identified Issues:

1. No questioning of pilot’s actions by the Master or other bridge team members

2. Poor understanding of internal roles & responsibilities within the PLA whereby VTS had a poor perception of what the harbour service launch would do in a grounding situation.

5. Handover of important information between river pilots, regarding the use of the inner mooring buoys, did not take place.

3. It was not possible to view the vessel's position monitoring equipment from the bridge wing position and the pilot was not using his tablet.


Vessel managers/owners should review bridge layouts and provision of electronic position monitoring aids on the bridge wing.

The vessel managers/owners should review bridge team practice for departure. The master should ensure he fully aware of the intended manoeuvre prior to departure so he knows what to expect and how he can assist the pilot in monitoring the vessels’ position.

Vessel managers/owners should review appropriateness of passage planning techniques and specifically the annotation of no-go and danger areas on the ECDIS display system.

Pilotage should remind all pilots the importance of a comprehensive pilot master exchange and update the Pilotage Service Order form checklist to remind pilots to explain and agree the manoeuvre with the master as well as how the position will be monitored on the bridge.

An agreed procedure should be put in place to clearly identify the use of inner mooring buoys and provide guidance to agents to ensure vessel departure times are book accordingly.

A review of training and familiarisation should be carried out to ensure all parties involved in marine incidents are aware of the responsibilities and needs of other roles within the incident.

Pilotage management should carry out a gap analysis to identify any pilots requiring additional training on the use of the iPads and specifically the use of SEAiq.

Pilotage management should consider simulating a similar departure manoeuvre to identify the affect of extreme draft differences and share the findings if lessons are learnt.

All pilots should attend at least one SEAiq refresher training sessions on a regular basis in line with simulator refresher training.

24/10/2018 On the 24th October 2018 a Ro Ro Vessel inbound for Purfleet Deep Water Lower swung for the berth and made contact with the lower link span then further contact was made with another Ro Ro Vessel berthed on Purfleet Deep Water Upper, then once cleared the berth went across the river and made contact with the lower caisson of a power station.

The vessel then regained control and berthed at Purfleet Deep Water Lower with no further incident.
Review procedures for pre arrival briefings and checklists and Masters standing orders to ensure that crew maintains vigilance.

The company is recommended to send all Masters, Engineers and Navigating officers on an MCA approved Bridge team management course tailored to the company's ferry operations.

Recommended the company review regular bridge and crew team crew maintain vigilance against potential for a decline in performance when working on repetitive operating patterns.

Company is recommended to include the findings of this report into future bridge team management training and to circulate reports throughout the fleet to share lessons learned.

With the PLA in agreement the Company have taken disciplinary action with the Master and Chief Officer.
03/09/2018 Aggregate Hopper barge moored alongside cofferdam wall at a Thames Tideway Tunnel site drifted down on the ebb tide and rode under the swim of a spudded barge. The tide went down, Aggregate Hopper barge grounded out and the spudded barge continued dropping on the tide. The bow of the Grey Moose opened the bow plating on the spudded barge. Full review of berthing procedures and mooring layouts at all central sites, minimum of 6 moorings per barge, additional lugs placed on cofferdam to secure to.

Tideway Safety Bulletin issued.
13/05/2018 During the vessel's departure from Vopak 1, mooring ropes became caught in ship's propeller causing injury to a crewmember. The vessel's engine was immediately stopped using the Emergency button and the vessel was secured alongside.

The injured crewmember sought medical attention and has been advised to rest for 7 days with soft tissue damage.
Recommendation for ships crew:
Retrain crew on hazards and dangers involved in mooring operations. Ensure any safety briefings and toolbox talks involve risks and entire mooring deck area should be considered a potential snap back zone.

Recommendation for Mooring crews: Limit excess mooring line and instruct mooring gangs to walk the line to the ship to prevent the ropes landing in the water. If not possible due to constraints of the berth, messenger lines should be considered.
24/03/2018 PLA Marine Services deckhand jarred back whilst attempting to move a mooring line between a fender pile and the river wall. Marine Services to review the manual handling course and include a rope handling section for operational staff.
14/02/2018 PLA Marine Services deckhand hurt his ankle while working on board the salvage cutter. All Marine services crew reminded to maintain a tidy workplace and ensure all equipment is properly stowed.
04/01/2018 An Ultra Large Container Ship was inbound for a London Gateway berth and was slowing down due to a vessel manoeuvring off a Jetty, when she suffered a blackout. The ULCS began to swing to port. Despite the helm being put hard to starboard the vessel continued to swing to port and the Pilot ordered the anchors to be let go. Shortly afterwards the vessel ran aground to the south of the navigation channel. The blackout occurred due to a fault with the generator, which shut down when the vessel's thrusters were started up.

The vessel was subject to a Port State Control Inspection by the MCA on arrival at London Gateway.
A copy of the final report to be circulated to Pilots and VTS.

A note of the deficiency was added to the vessel notes in POLARIS.

The incident was reported to the MCA, who carried out a Port State Control Inspection once the vessel had berthed.
04/01/2018 Grounding of ULCS in Sea Reach after blackout. A copy of the final report to be circulated to Pilots and VTS. A note of the deficiency was added to the vessel notes in POLARIS. The incident was reported to the MCA, who carried out a Port State Control Inspection once the vessel had berthed.
11/11/2017 A Tanker was swinging towards the berth, on departure, when her bow made heavy contact with the upper dolphin of the berth. The impact caused significant damage to the dolphin, and the starboard bow of the vessel was penetrated just above the waterline, in way of the fore peak tank. PLA to review the Pilot's training in relation to large vessels and the use of tugs to determine whether any further training is required.

Review the procedures/guidance to Pilots with regards to taking trippers.

Circulate report to all Pilots, highlighting lessons identified.

Terminal manager to review mooring procedures and consider a representative to remain at the jetty until a departing vessel has swung clear.

DPA to remind Masters of the need for good Bridge Team Management when Pilot on board.
23/10/2017 A rope guard previously installed on a safety boat had picked up some debris, which then holed the vessel’s hull. A watertight bulkhead had previously been drilled through to run hydraulic hoses, however these holes were not made watertight, which, resulting in a rapid sinking.

A boom was established around the sunken vessel as there was a sheen on the water in the vicinity.
The owners of the Safety Boat were advised to reinstate the watertight integrity of the bulkhead and deck by way of watertight fittings for the hydraulic steering system. The owners of the vessel have also removed the rope guard.
05/10/2017 London VTS were notified by the Master of a tug that a loaded dumb barge was taking on water moored at Jetty Barge Roads in Gallions Reach. It was reported the barge remained afloat but trimmed heavily by the port bow with the deck close to the waterline. The tug attempted to salvage the barge but it capsized and sank. The barge was loaded with 400 tonnes of sand and 200 tonnes of limestone. PLA to ensure the Harbour Service Launch is dispatched immediately to acquire good quality photographic evidence of any vessel at risk of foundering in order to aid future incident investigations.

PLA to consider sending a Marine Surveyor to be present during salvage operations to acquire photographic evidence throughout the operation, and to permit an inspection of the vessel immediately post salvage and prior to any modifications being made to the wreck.

Tug company to ensure tanks are sounded prior to and after any passage and the results recorded, as required under Section 5.2 of the PLA Craft Towage Operations Code of Practice and to review training and procedures to ensure the necessary action is taken as a result of the soundings.
05/10/2017 A loaded barge moored at Gallions Barge Roads had capsized. PLA to ensure the Harbour Service Launch is dispatched immediately to acquire photographic evidence in order to aid future incident investigations.

PLA to consider sending a Marine Surveyor to be present during salvage operations to acquire evidence throughout the operation, and inspect the vessel immediately post salvage and prior to any modifications being made to the wreck.

Tug company to ensure tanks are sounded prior to and after passage and the results recorded, as required under Section 5.2 of the PLA Craft Towage Operations Code of Practice and to review training and procedures to ensure the necessary action is taken as a result of the soundings.
08/09/2017 The supervisor loading a barge was doing so using the barge’s draught marks, not realising that the barge was aground at low water.

The barge had a 1,500 tonne capacity but was loaded with 1875 tonnes. When the tide rose the overloaded barge was not able to float with the tide and remained aground, causing it to founder whilst secured alongside a jetty.

To re-float the barge, the crane barge was used to remove part of the load into another barge and re-float the loaded barge.
Tug company to review and update the Safe System of Work procedure and introduce a stop work policy over low tide when the barge is aground.

Prior to loading operations commencing jetty operatives and lighterman to conduct a briefing on the planned tonnage (max tonnage to be posted in the conveyor control box), tide, method of communication.

Jetty Operatives to use the extension lead for the conveyor remote control to ensure line of sight with the lighterman at all times. Standby tug available whilst loading.
16/08/2017 A product tanker ran aground a short distance off the Broadness Light tower after suffering a complete power failure due to contaminated fuel. Due to prompt action by the pilot and crew on board both anchors were deployed which reduced the vessel's headway prior to grounding. The vessel re-floated on the tide and was taken to Tilbury Power Station Jetty to complete a damage assessment.

The contaminated fuel tank was cleaned and dirty filters replaced.
Review Pilot training to ensure adequate training is given to prepare new pilots and refresh existing pilots on different emergency procedures.

Review Emergency Checklists.

Undertake training exercises with VTSOs using emergency checklists.
11/08/2017 While a mooring maintenance vessel was carrying out routine maintenance on Sea Reach No. 1 navigation buoy, two crew members suffered injuries during the recovery of the pennant chain.

Whilst heaving the chain on board it appeared to snag the anchor wire, causing he wire to be pulled across the deck. The anchor wire then snapped back, hitting the two crew members. One crew member sustained a hair line fracture to the left fibula, the second crew member sustained severe bruising to the top of his right thigh.
The Overhauling Navigation Buoy Procedure has been reviewed and updated.

Crew carrying out Tool Box Talks have been reminded to use the Tool Box Talk Pointers to aid them in reminding crew of potential hazards which have previously been identified.
29/06/2017 A dumb barge was alongside a Cruise ship at TBU providing bunkering services. London VTS received a report there was pollution in the Upper Pool. On investigation, the Harbour Service Launch reported large amounts of oil visible on the barge and in the river. The TOSCA and RECOVER were tasked to undertake clean up operations. Operators of the barge to review the safe system of work (SSOW) and update with revised communication procedures.

Operators of the barge to ensure any incidents are reported to London VTS immediately as per Thames byelaw 8.

Agents advised to require written confirmation for any future discharge operations.

Agents advised to request confirmation in writing vessels are appropriately licensed for the operation they are undertaking.

PLA Marine Services Manager to charge full costs of the clean up operation to the owners of the barge.
29/06/2017 A pollution incident occurred during waste transfer between a barge and a cruise ship moored at HMS Belfast. Operators of the waste transfer vessel to create a safe system of work (SSOW) with revised communication procedures, revise SMS and ensure any incidents are reported immediately as per Thames Byelaw 8.

Shipping Services advised to require acceptance in writing for any future discharge operations and confirmation in writing vessels are appropriately licensed for the operation they are undertaking.

PLA Marine Services Manager to charge full costs of the clean up operation to the owners of the waste transfer vessel.
16/06/2017 A cruise ship transiting the Thames Barrier inbound for Greenwich Ship Tier, with TUG 1 secured forward and TUG 2 aft, started closing on pier 7 of Delta span of the Thames Barrier. The pilot countered the closing stern with a "hard to port" helm order, to lift the stern away from the pier. The cruise ship stabilised and began to swing to port; to counter this "hard to starboard" was subsequently ordered due to the anticipated northerly tidal set. This led to the stern of the CRUISE SHIP closing again on pier 7 of Delta span, the same "hard to port" helm order was applied, but was insufficient to stop the port quarter making contact with pier 7 of Delta span.

The vessel cleared the Thames Barrier and the Chief Officer was tasked to investigate the damage and reported there were no hull penetrations. The CRUISE SHIP continued on passage to Greenwich Ship Tier without further incident. The Harbour Service Launch remained in attendance throughout conducting local traffic control.
The PLA has reviewed the risk assessment for vessels over 210m length overall navigating above the Thames Barrier with regard to the lessons identified following this investigation and developed a revised methodology for Thames Barrier transits at 2-3 knots SOG that allows the primary pilot to position on the bridge wing, which pilots will also undertake in a simulator prior to the voyage and annually in a variety of environmental conditions. Cruise ship captains will be invited to attend.

A Protocol has been developed to support the changeover of conduct from the Primary to Secondary pilot during the change of controls from the central to bridge wing positions and increase PPU tripping for River Pilots and standardise the way information is passed to ensure effective communication.

Establish the Thames above Margaretness as a high-risk area and ensure all non-essential personnel are clear from the bridge. This should form part of the Pilot/Master Exchange.
05/05/2017 A Dutch Barge lost propulsion and drifted towards London Bridge.

A river patrol vessel assisted and made an approach to the barge with the intention of taking the vessel alongside. The Master of the Dutch Barge was standing on the deck of the barge intending to receive a line and due to significant wash both vessels rolled towards each other and the Master of the barge was caught between the vessels.

Despite the crushing injury the Master was able to make the line fast. The patrol vessel manoeuvred the vessel alongside the PLA driftwood mooring at New Fresh Wharf.

The RNLI attended and treated the Master for a fractured pelvis before taking him to Tower Pier where he was transferred to hospital.
The PLA will produce a Safety Bulletin highlighting the need for adequate engine trials before undertaking voyages on newly repaired engines.

The Towage Risk Assessment and method statement for the river patrol vessel is to be reviewed and updated and formal towage training provided for crews. CCTV is to be installed on the vessels in future.

The Master of the Dutch Barge was advised of the importance of comprehensive engine checks following substantive engineering works and danger zones during towing operations.
03/04/2017 A Class V vessel had experienced engine difficulties during the afternoon, which was reported to their base, however the Master declined a replacement vessel, believing it safe to continue.

The vessel's starboard engine then failed causing the vessel to make contact with the No. 4 arch of Southwark Bridge. This caused significant damage to the superstructure of the vessel. The engine was successfully restarted once clear of the bridge and the vessel returned to base without further incident.
The PLA has recommended to the operator that they review their procedure for withdrawing vessels from service in the event of machinery failure by the operations team and also conduct a full review and audit of the CCTV systems on all vessels, to establish that they are in good working order.

The Master has received a verbal warning for not supervising the unqualified Mate on the helm and the operator has been advised to review procedures to ensure that if an unqualified crew member takes the helm, they are directly supervised by the Master at all times.

The PLA will be performing spot checks on vessels to ensure a qualified person is at the helm, or a qualified person is providing dedicated supervision to unqualified crew at all times in compliance with PLA General Direction 18.
25/03/2017 12 Inward bound Rowing Eights were racing each other with the flood tide in a private rowing race from Nine Elms Reach to Putney Hard.

Whilst in Chelsea Reach, four Rowing Eights were abreast of each other and one of these crews was unaware of the middle abutment of Albert Bridge.

A number of coaching launches attempted to make the Cox aware of this but to no avail. The Eight struck the abutment resulting in the bow being broken off and the crew entering the water. The crew was rescued with no reported injuries.

The Eights were also involved in a Near Miss with a Tug and Tow at Cringle Dock.
The Thames Regional Rowing Council (TRRC) banned all involved from waterborne activities, with all coxes and coaches resitting tideway endorsement examinations.

The TRRC will be improving the content of annual safety inductions and organise annual cox and coaches refresher training. An Annual Coaches Forum will be looked at being developed.

The TRRC will consider reviewing sanctions and procedures available to the TRRC and future contingency options for all Head of the River Races.

The Rowing Code has been amended as follows:
  • Crews proceeding below Wandsworth Bridge, regardless of tide, must have the outing plan pre-approved by the Club's Rowing Safety Advisor.
  • Restriction on rowing below Fulham Railway Bridge extended to two hours after high tide.
Those involved were issued with Harbour Masters Warnings – The Cox under Section 108 of the Port of London Act and the organising Coach under failure to comply with Thames Byelaw 9.


Classification of Navigational Incidents in the Port of London

Navigational Incidents reported under the PLA's marine Safety management System are classified by severity as follows:

Minor Incident: Incidents, which do not affect persons and have a negligible cost implication (<£5K) 

Serious Incident: Incidents which may involve slight/significant injury to persons and have a moderate cost implication (>£50K)

Very Serious incident: Incidents reported to the Board, which involve serious injury or fatality and have a serious/major cost implication (>£2M)

Incidents are categorised as follows:

Floating Hazard
Pilot Ladder Deficiency
Vessel Equipment Deficiency
Loss of Hull Integrity
Vessel Navigation Aid Deficiency
Foreshore Incident
Criminal/Malicious Damage
Man Overboard
Near Miss
Safe Access Deficiency
Innappropriate Navigation
Port Security Incident
Navigational Hazard
Breach of Byelaws
Breach of General Directions